An Evolutionary Theory of Inflation Inertia by ANAGNOSTOPOULOS, Alexis & LICANDRO, Omar
EUI WORKING PAPERS
D e p a r t m e n t  o f  E c o n o m i c s
An Evolutionary Theory of Inflation Inertia 
ALEXIS ANAGNOSTOPOULOS 
and OMAR LICANDRO 
                 ECO No. 2006/33
Copertina ECO.indd   1 07/12/2006   13:10:01
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
 
An Evolutionary Theory of Inflation Inertia 
ALEXIS ANAGNOSTOPOULOS   
and  
OMAR LICANDRO 
EUI Working Paper ECO No. 2006/33
  
This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional 
reproduction for such purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of 
the author(s), editor(s). If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the 
author(s), editor(s), the title, the working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher. 
 
The author(s)/editor(s) should inform the Economics Department of the EUI if the paper is to 
be published elsewhere, and should also assume responsibility for any consequent 
obligation(s). 
 
ISSN 1725-6704 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2006 Alexis Anagnostopoulos and Omar Licandro 
Printed in Italy  
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
 
http://www.iue.it/ 
http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/index.jsp 
An evolutionary theory of ination inertia
Alexis Anagnostopoulos
Stony Brook
Omar Licandro
European University Institute
Italo Bove
Universidad de la República
Karl Schlag
European University Institute
September 2006
Abstract
We provide a simple theory of ination inertia in a staggered price setting frame-
work a la Calvo (1983). Contrary to Calvos formulation, the frequency of price
changes is allowed to vary according to an evolutionary criterion. Inertia is the
direct result of gradual adjustment in this frequency following a permanent change
in the rate of money growth.
1 Introduction
The recent literature on monetary policy has widely used the sticky price model proposed
by Calvo (1983) as a simple way of generating the so-called (New Keynesian) Phillips
curve, a negative relation between ination and the output gap see Woodford (1994) or
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), amongst others. However, as pointed out by Fuhrer and
Moore (1995), the Calvo model does not succeed in reproducing the observed persistence
of ination. In Calvo (1983), even if only a few rms change prices at any period, the
assumption of rational expectations implies that these rms fully understand the price
e¤ects of changes in the environment. This in turn has important implications for the
behavior of ination. In particular, when the economy faces an unexpected change in the
rate of money growth, the forward-looking behavior of those few rms currently changing
prices is enough for the economy to anticipate the e¤ect of the shock on ination. In
other words, rms currently setting prices will choose their prices in such a way that the
overall level of ination will immediately jump to the new steady state.
In this paper, we use an evolutionary game approach to solve a Calvo (1983) economy
with a cash-in-advance constraint as a simple way of generating ination inertia. The
description of the economy is taken directly from Calvo (1983), but money is introduced
following Clower (1967) instead of Sidrauski (1967). When a rational expectations equi-
librium is computed for this economy, the standard result that ination automatically
Anagnostopoulos and Licandro would like to thank the nancial support of the European Commission
under the MAPMU network . A rst draft of this paper was written while Licandro was visiting the
London Business School during August 2006. Comments by Gilles Saint-Paul on a previous version are
gratefully acknowledged.
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adjusts to a permanent, unexpected shock in the growth rate of money supply holds.
However, when rms play an evolutionary game in prices, instead of behaving consis-
tently with rational expectations, ination responds slowly and gradually to exogenous
shocks to the money supply growth rate. In the evolutionary economy, a rm receiving
a price-change signal follows a simple rule of thumb relating its price to the observed
money supply. The probability of observing a price-change signal, and thus the frequency
with which rms change prices, evolves depending on the performance of this price rule
relative to any other price observed in the economy. When rms changing prices per-
form better (worse) than those that keep posting their old prices, price change signals
become more (less) frequent. We refer to this dynamic adjustment as the Darwinian
dynamics, to highlight the underlying idea that successful behavior tends to spread in
the population. Within this setup, the response of ination to a permanent negative
shock on the rate of money growth is gradual. Even though price-changing rms keep
playing the same price rule as before, ination will tend towards the new rate of money
growth due to the Darwinian dynamics. That is the dynamic adjustment of ination
will work through the adjustment in the probability of observing a price-change signal.
That adjustment will be slow and gradual, delivering in a simple, intuitive way ination
inertia.
Our approach is not unique in delivering the result of ination inertia. A growing
recent literature seeks ways of obtaining ination persistence by modifying the sticky
price model that originates in Calvos staggered price setting formulation. The most
notable of such attempts is due to Mankiw and Reis (2002). They stress the role of
sticky information as an alternative to sticky prices. Under sticky information, rms
revise prices every period but their decisions are not always based on current information.
Inertia results from the fact that some price setters decide on price changes based on past
information. A similar reasoning explains why a sticky price framework augmented with
price indexation delivers the same result.12 In an evolutionary framework, information
spreads across the economy through evolution, i.e. the replication of high performing
behavior. In this paper, changes in the environment a¤ect price-pioneersprots making
its size in population adjust. Inertia results because news are not observed and, more
important, agents dont adapt their behavior to them, but the economy learns slowly
through the replication of those behaviors that are most adapted to the new environment.
2 The Economy
The economy in this paper is very close to the model of Calvo (1983), with the di¤erence
that money is introduced following Clower (1967) instead of Sidrauski (1967). The
fundamentals are described as in the general equilibrium tradition. However, instead
of using an equilibrium concept to formalize the behavior of agents and markets, an
evolutionary game in prices is assumed and its outcome is computed.
1For a detailed analysis of the similarities and di¤erences between the two models see Trabandt
(2006).
2Yet another interesting recent development on the issue is due to Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2006)
who derive ination and price setting implications of rational inattention, an idea originally suggested
by Chris Sims (2003).
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Time is continuous. There is a sole, perishable and divisible good. The economy
is populated by a continuum of rms in the interval [0; 1]. At every instant, each rm
receives, as manna from heaven, a strictly positive endowment of size q. Therefore,
the total amount of goods available at t is q. There is a continuum of individuals;
the representative individual has innite life, time additive preferences with constant,
strictly positive discount rate, owns rms and holds money. Money Mt is issued by a
central bank and is permanently increasing at the instantaneous rate  > 0
Mt =M0e
t.
Any increase in money supply is distributed across individuals as a lump-sum transfer.
In the spirit of Clower (1967), money is required for transactions any form of barter
is forbidden meaning that money plays the role of both a unit of account and a medium
of exchange. Individuals hold money and use their money holdings to buy goods. Firms
collect prots in the form of money and give the money back to individuals as dividends.
What can we learn from equilibrium theory? Under standard conditions on pref-
erences, an equilibrium path with binding cash-in-advance constraint exists. Such an
equilibrium is consistent with the quantity theory of money Ptq = Mt, where Pt is the
equilibrium price of the physical good and the velocity of money is one.3 In the evo-
lutionary economy described below the equilibrium price plays no role, since agents do
not use it to take any economic decision. However, we will use the equilibrium outcome
as a benchmark to analyze the performance of the evolutionary economy, by comparing
evolutionary prices to the equilibrium price.
The evolutionary game we propose is extremely simple and very close to the price
setting process in Calvo (1983). Firms keep announcing the same price until they receive
a price-change signal. Firms receiving such a signal, instead of computing an optimal
price consistent with rational expectations as in Calvo, set a price proportional to the
observed money supply. This simple rule of thumb allows prices to follow money. We
call these rms price-pioneers; they understand that prices must increase since money
is growing and they implement it in a simple way. They play a similar role as Calvo
players in the Calvo model. The price-change signal arrives with an instantaneous rate
that adjusts upwards or downwards depending on whether the price-pioneer is making
the largest prots. This is a simple application of the Darwinian principle that suc-
cessful behavior tends to replicate. Let us now be more precise on the denition of the
evolutionary game.
At any time t, rms announce prices and engage on satisfying demand at these
prices until they run out of stock. As a consequence, it may be that some rms keep
unsold units of the perishable good, which cannot be transferred to the next period.
In such a case, these rms are said to be quantity constrained by a demand shortage.
The representative individual uses her money holdings to buy as much of the physical
good as she can. She is assumed to observe all current prices, order rms by prices and
buy following the order of prices, the lowest price rst. As a result, either individuals
spend the total available amount of money Mt or all rms run out of stock. In order
to ensure individuals are identical, we make the assumption that any excess demand is
3See Lucas and Stokey (1987) and Woodford (1994).
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proportionally distributed across individuals. We say that the representative individual
is quantity constrained when she cannot buy as many units as she would like, because
of a shortage of supply.4
Firms prices are set according to the following rules. At the initial time t = 0,
rms carry prices from the past. The relevant information on the initial distribution
of prices can be summarized by P0, the average price announced at t = 0. At any
time t  0, rms keep announcing their previous prices until they receive a price-change
signal, in which case they set a price proportional to the money supply, i.e., ^Mt, ^ > 0.
We refer to the rms that receive a price change signal as price-pioneers. In order to
follow this price rule, the only information requirement is that price-pioneers observe
the money supply Mt. Note that this rule is equivalent to setting a price proportional
to the equilibrium price Pt, which was dened previously as Pt = Mtq : That is, one can
equivalently express the pioneersprice setting rule as (1 + )Pt, with  = ^q   1. We
use this notation for convenience from now on, but it is important to clarify that we do
not require price pioneers to observe the equilibrium price Pt; observing Mt is enough.
Since the pioneer always sets the largest price let us assume that  > 0, otherwise the
average announced price would be smaller than the equilibrium price and the economy
would (by construction) permanently be in a situation of excess demand.
The probability density of receiving a price-change signal during a period of length
k from time t is assumed to be
t+k e
  R k0 t+z dz;
with t > 0 representing the density of price-pioneers in the distribution of rms at time
t. This is similar to Calvo (1983), the di¤erence amounting to the fact that in Calvo t
is constant.
At any time t, let us denote by pkt the price set by price-pioneers at t   k, k  0.
By denition of the pioneers price rule, pkt = (1 + )Pt k = (1 + ) e kPt, since the
equilibrium price follows money by denition. Let hkt be the density of the t k pioneers
still announcing pkt at time t, which is hkt = t k e 
R k
0 t z dz. Lastly, the average price
announced by rms at time t  0, which we denote by Pt, can be expressed as
Pt = P0 e 
R t
0 z dz +
Z
k
pkthkt dk = P0 e 
R t
0 s ds + (1 + )AtPt; (1)
where
At =
Z t
0
e (t z)z e 
R t
z s dsdz:
We have used the variable change z = t  k to obtain At. When t goes to innity, initial
conditions vanish and the ratio of the average to the equilibrium price converges to
Pt
Pt
= (1 + )

 + 
if t converges to a constant value .
4A large literature in the seventies and eighties has developed equilibrium concepts to deal with
situations where markets are not cleared by prices. See Benassy (1982) and Dreze (1974).
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From the description of the evolutionary game above, the economy is in excess supply
or excess demand depending on
Mt 7 qPt or equivalently PtPt 7 1:
The second relation follows directly from the rst after substituting the denition of
the equilibrium price Pt = Mtq . The following Lemma shows that there is a one-to-one
relationship between excess supply and excess demand on the one hand and the pioneers
performance on the other hand.
Lemma 1 If Pt  Pt then the pioneer is making the largest prots, otherwise the pioneer
is not making the largest prots.
Proof. Let xkt and kt denote goods sold and prots made by a rm that was a price
pioneer at t   k and has not changed its prices since. Thus for a current price-pioneer,
goods sold are denoted by x0t and prots by 0t. When Pt  Pt, the economy is in
excess demand, implying that x0t = q and 0t  kt for all k > 0. When Pt > Pt, the
economy is in excess supply. Since pioneers are setting the largest price and have zero
measure in the distribution of prices, x0t = 0 and 0t = 0, implying that price-pioneers
are not making the largest prots. That is because prices are strictly positive and some
rms are selling q, therefore making strictly positive prots.
In the rst situation, the average price is lower than the equilibrium price, implying that
the economy is in excess demand, i.e. consumers cannot spend all their money holdings.
In this case, the pioneer is setting the largest price, running out of stock, and making the
largest prots. In the other case, the economy is facing an excess supply. Since pioneers
are charging the largest price, they receive no demand and make zero prots.
Lastly, let us specify the Darwinian dynamics as
_t = 
Pt   Pt
Pt (2)
where  > 0 is the velocity of the evolutionary process. From the previous Lemma, Pt ?
Pt is an indicator of the price-pioneersperformance. The Darwinian dynamics assumes
that the probability density of being a pioneer increases (decreases) when pioneers are
(not) making the largest prots. This is an application of the Darwinian principle saying
that successful behavior tends to replicate in the population. Note that the absolute size
of both the equilibrium and the evolutionary price grows with money holdings. The
observed absolute distances between the two will therefore also increase with time. To
ensure the evolutionary adjustment is not a¤ected by this articial increase, we divide
the right-hand-side by Pt, i.e. we relate the rate of change in  to relative distance from
the equilibrium price.
3 Ination inertia
In this section, we study the dynamics of the evolutionary economy and compare them
to the dynamics of the Calvo model. The main objective is the analysis of ination
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inertia in the case of a permanent change in the rate of money growth. We show that,
contrary to the behavior of the Calvo model where ination jumps instantaneously to
the new rate of money growth, in the evolutionary economy ination moves gradually
from its past level to the new one. That is, there is no ination inertia in the Calvo
model, but the evolutionary economy generates it since there is high persistence in past
behavior.
3.1 Evolutionary Economy
By di¤erentiating (1) with respect to t, we get
_Pt = t ((1 + )Pt   Pt) : (3)
Note that only pioneers change prices and they do so with probability density t. On
average, they move from the average announced price Pt to the new price (1 + )Pt.
It is easy to see that (3) is a particular version of the Phillips curve. Let us dene
the output gap, a measure of excess supply, as
yt 
q   MtPt
q
where MtPt is the amount of goods individuals would like to buy at the announced prices
and q is the total endowment, a measure of capacity. Using this denition, we can write
(3) as
t 
_Pt
Pt = t (   (1 + ) yt) ;
which implies that ination t depends negatively on the output gap.
Let us now rewrite the dynamic system. From the denition of the equilibrium
price Pt = Mtq , the output gap can be written as yt = 1   pt, with pt = PtPt . After
straightforward algebra (3) becomes
_pt
pt
=   t ((1 + ) pt   1) : (4)
From the denition of pt, the Darwinian dynamics (2) can be written as
_t =  (pt   1) : (5)
The economy has now been reduced to equations (4) and (5), an ODE system in p
and . Since the system is purely backward looking, both p and  are state variables,
implying that initial conditions p0 and 0 need to be specied. From (4) and (5), pt = 1
and t =

 at steady state. At the steady state of the evolutionary economy, the average
price announced by rms is equal to the equilibrium price, implying that the economy
is in equilibrium. The instantaneous probability of being a pioneer depends positively
on the growth rate of money supply and negatively on , the constant in the pioneers
price setting rule. When the money supply is growing at a large rate, nominal aggregate
demand is growing at a large rate too. In a sticky price framework, pioneers are making
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large prots since other rms are not changing their prices. Evolution increases the
number of pioneers, which increases ination and reduces pioneers prots up to the
point where the evolutionary economy is at steady state. This is very di¤erent from
the Calvo economy, where the probability of receiving a price-change signal is constant
and the economy adjusts through changes in Calvo playersprices. In the evolutionary
economy, the probability of receiving a price-change signal is endogenous and positively
related to the growth rate of money, which implies the desirable prediction that in a
high ination environment rms change prices more frequently.5
The eigenvalues of the linearized system (4)-(5) are
 (1 + )


s
(1 + )

2
  4:
Both eigenvalues are negative real numbers if  

(1+)

2
1
4 , otherwise they are com-
plex numbers with negative real part. The solution does converge, but it may converge
by oscillations if the Darwinian dynamics adjust at high speed.
We study ination inertia by analyzing the reaction of (4)-(5) to a permanent, neg-
ative shock to the rate of money growth, under the assumption that the economy was
initially at steady state. The unit of time is a quarter. The quarterly rate of money
growth was 2.5% before the shock and the new one is 2%, a 2 percentage points reduc-
tion in the annual growth rate. The instantaneous rate of price-change signals decreases
from 0.30 to 0.24 in the new steady state. As it can be observed in Figure 1 ination
is persistent, with an impulse response function close to the one generated by sticky in-
formation.6 Pioneers keep playing the same price rule as before the shock and ination
reduces gradually at the speed with which the Darwinian dynamics reduces the size of
price-pioneers in the total population.7
3.2 Calvo (1983)
To understand better the novelty of our result, we compare it to the cash-in-advance
version of Calvo (1983). Equilibrium in the Calvo model is described by an ODE system
for ination t and real money balances mt:8
_mt
mt
=   t (6)
_t = b (q  mt) : (7)
5A similar dynamic system emerges from an economy with constant probability density  and a simple
learning process in  of the type _t =  (pt   1), with  > 0, where the pioneers rule adjusts upwards
or downwards depending on pioneersprots. For example, under excess demand p > 1, pioneers can
increase prots by increasing .
6See Mankiw and Reis (2002), the bottom picture of Figure II on page 1305.
7 Inertia depends crucially on the velocity of the replicator dynamics process. We set  = 0:46,
implying that eigenvalues are complex. The eigenvalues are real for  < 0:2, in which case ination
converges monotonically in less than 20 quarters. For very large values of , ination convergences by
oscillations moving at a very high frequency.
8See equations (20b,c) in Calvo (1983), with c = m because of the cash-in-advance constraint.
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Figure 1: Reaction of quarterly ination to a permanent reduction in the quarterly
growth rate of money from 0.025 to 0.02
Since nominal money balances are a stock and prices are sticky, real money balances
are a predetermined variable, with given initial condition m0 > 0. Ination is not
predetermined, even if the average price level is. Equation (6) comes directly from
the denition of real balances, which stop moving when ination is equal to the growth
rate of money. Equation (7) results from the price setting process and says that ination
adjusts to the output gap, i.e., the di¤erence between aggregate capacity q and aggregate
demand m. Parameter b represents the speed of ination adjustment, which depends
negatively on the average time before a price change occurs (the inverse of the rate of
price-change signals ). Remember that in Calvo the average price is a state variable.
When the economy is in excess supply, prices have to increase; since they cannot jump
instantaneously, ination has to increase to reduce the output gap. At steady state,
ination is equal to the rate of money growth (t = ) and the endowment is fully
consumed (mt = q). The system (6)-(7) is saddle path stable, with both m and 
increasing monotonically if the economy is initially in excess supply, i.e. if q > m0.
In order to study ination inertia, as in the case of the evolutionary economy, let us
assume the Calvo economy is initially at steady state. It is easy to see that it adjusts
to an unexpected permanent shock on the growth rate of money supply by jumping to
the new steady state. Remember that a change in  only a¤ects the steady state value
of ination, implying that the steady state value of m remains unchanged. Since at
the time of the shock real balances are assumed to be at steady state, from the saddle-
path properties of the model, ination has to directly jump to the new steady state.
Consequently, the Calvo model shows no ination inertia.
At the stationary solution of the Calvo model, the economy consumes the whole
endowment q, meaning that the average price is equal to the equilibrium price. At steady
state, given  and , rms receiving a price-change signal set a price equal to (1 + )Pt,
where  =  as in the evolutionary economy. However, this equilibrium outcome results
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from the forward-looking behavior of Calvo players. It is important to notice that, at
the time of the shock, Calvo players automatically adjust  to its new steady state value.
This is a direct implication of rational expectations. They know the economy is jumping
to the new steady state and use this information to perfectly forecast present and future
ination. Importantly, they incorporate this information in their price rule, making it
jump to the new steady state too. In contrast, our price pioneers are backward looking
and follow a simple rule of thumb. The ination adjustment in the evolutionary economy
takes place gradually because it relies on the Darwinian dynamics.
4 Conclusion
Calvos (1983) method of incorporating staggered price setting in a utility maximizing
framework is by now standard in the literature on New Keynesian Macroeconomics. One
of the main weaknesses of the original formulation was a failure to deliver the empiri-
cally observed levels of persistence in ination. Prominent remedies of this shortcoming
include the introduction of price indexation in an otherwise standard sticky price model
and the replacement of the assumption of sticky prices with sticky information. Here
we have provided a simple alternative to those remedies. We have shown that, if prices
are determined using an evolutionary principle, ination inertia arises naturally even in
a sticky price framework without price indexation.
In Calvos original formulation, a fraction of rms sets prices optimally, using all
available information and forming expectations rationally. This has the undesirable
e¤ect that, even if the optimizing rms are a tiny minority, their choices will be such
that the overall ination level will jump immediately to the new steady state in response
to a permanent change in the money growth rate. Our evolutionary economy eventually
converges to a stationary state where the average price (and ination) is equal to the
rational expectations equilibrium price (and ination). However, in response to a change
in the fundamentals, its convergence to the rational expectations ination is only gradual.
This is because no single rm realizes the changes in the economy, it is rather the economy
as a whole that learns about the new environment through a process of Darwinian
selection. Firms receiving a price change signal keep playing the same price rule as
before. But the frequency of the price change signal (or equivalently the number of rms
that receive it) evolves as it becomes more or less protable for rms to change their
price and eventually converges to a stationary level consistent with rational expectation
ination, but only after a signicant period of adjustment.
A numerical example provides an indication as to the strength of ination inertia,
more detailed quantitative prediction will be presented in a follow up article.
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